Another sad anniversary in Myanmar

As Myanmar’s latest military government, the self-styled State Administration Council (SAC), winds up its fourth year in power, observers following developments in that deeply troubled country have fallen into two broad schools.

First, there are those supporters of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and other pro-democracy activists who desperately want the multi-faceted opposition movement to defeat the junta on the battlefield and form a new national government. Ever hopeful of a breakthrough, they tend to seize upon every hint of good news to claim that victory is just around the corner. 

Over the years, their predictions have been coloured by more than a little emotion and wishful thinking. For example, in late 2023 and early 2024, when a coalition of ethnic armed organisations (EAO) inflicted several major defeats on the junta’s armed forces in northern Myanmar, the civil war was said to be “at a tipping point”. The junta was described as “mortally wounded”, indeed, that it was “on the brink of collapse”. 

Sadly, as history has shown, these claims were all rather premature. 

The continued survival of the junta, albeit in increasingly straightened circumstances, has strengthened the view of the second school, which believes that Myanmar’s bitter civil war could grind on for years, without a decisive conclusion. The generals retain control over the country’s economic heartland and most of its population. They enjoy Russian and Chinese support, face no external threats and still collect considerable export revenues. 

Also, while the opposition movement has made remarkable progress in military terms, it is still divided over strategic objectives. The EAOs and NUG share the goal of destroying the SAC, but beyond that little has been agreed. Military victories have yielded large quantities of arms and ammunition, but opposition fighters still suffer from a lack of resources. Despite its pleas, the NUG has been unable to win formal recognition or lethal aid from any foreign governments. 

There is a third factor which must also be taken into account, and that is the increasing role of China. There has long been speculation that, if it was not actually pulling the strings, Beijing was cynically trying to manipulate developments in Myanmar and profit from them. Behind such simplistic analyses, however, lies a much more complex and nuanced attempt by China to stay on the right side of history, while protecting its long-term strategic interests.

China’s role has been highlighted recently by the announcement that Beijing has just brokered a ceasefire deal between the junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) that may include a withdrawal of rebel forces from the key town of Lashio. The MNDAA is a major player in the north of the country, both in its own right and as a member of the Three Brothers Alliance, which led the highly successful Operation 1027 campaign in 2023-24.

The ceasefire is significant in a number of ways. It grants concessions to the MNDAA and gives the hard-pressed junta some respite in northern Shan State. It also permits the resumption of trade and movement across the volatile Myanmar-China border. To a degree at least, China has been able protect its interests in northern Myanmar and help safeguard its vital economic corridor to Myanmar’s west coast.

It is important, however, to keep this agreement in perspective. A similar truce last year was not honoured by either side. MNDAA troops are still to leave Lashio. Also, the MNDAA is only one of a number of EAOs that pose a challenge to the junta, and by implication China, in Myanmar. There is no sign that similar arrangements are being made with any of them. The NUG and its People’s Defence Forces have already ruled out any compromise with the junta.

It is also relevant that China was able to exert pressure on the MNDAA in ways that it cannot replicate with regard to other EAOs or the NUG. Given the proximity of the MNDAA’s territory to China, for example, Beijing can shut down key border crossings, and deny the insurgent group electricity, fuel, medicine, food and other necessities, most of which are sourced from Yunnan. It can also restrict the flow of Chinese weapons to the MNDAA.

It has even been suggested that, when MNDAA leader Peng Daxun went to China last October for medical treatment, he was held hostage by Beijing to encourage the group to strike a deal with the junta. He has now been released.

China does not have that kind of clout with the other EAOs, or with the NUG. Indeed, some groups have the means to push back against China. The Kachin Independence Army, for example, has been able to resist Chinese pressure to stop fighting along the border. It also controls key mineral and timber resources. Also, there is speculation that Beijing is keen to negotiate a deal with the Arakan Army, which currently threatens China’s special economic zone and port facilities at Kyaukpyu. This would deeply trouble the junta.

As always, China has its own interests firmly in mind. It is prepared to play the long game, cosying up to the junta when it suits and dealing directly with opposition groups when that too is expedient. It is prepared to do whatever it takes to ensure a measure of stability on its strategic southern border, to retain access to Myanmar’s precious natural resources and to protect its investments, including the vital economic corridor to the Indian Ocean.

The junta has been prepared to cut deals on an opportunistic basis, hence its patently self-serving calls in recent months for negotiations with the EAOs. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing went to Kunming last year for discussions with Chinese leaders. The MNDAA deal appears to have been one result. However, the SAC has shown no sign of abandoning its hard-line position, or of considering a genuine and comprehensive peace treaty with the NUG.

The MNDAA ceasefire could be interpreted as a sign of the junta’s weakness. It has also been hailed by a few hopeful observers as a sign of progress towards an eventual peace, perhaps negotiated with China’s help. However, there have been many false dawns in Myanmar’s intermittent progress towards a more democratic, humane and prosperous future. This is likely to be another one.

One prominent Myanmar-watcher wrote earlier this month that the junta is in “terminal decline”. Most Burmese and many others around the world hope that this is true. However, if history has taught us anything since the events of 1 February 2021, it is to be careful about predicting the downfall of the military regime. As the SAC begins its fifth year in power, that is worth keeping in mind.

Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. His latest book is A Myanmar Miscellany (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2024).