After the Inauguration

American presidential inaugurations traditionally nurture a sense of unity, pride and aspiration – drawing on the quality of American oratory brought to mind by John Kennedy and Barack Obama – that causes emotions to soar.

Not so in 2017. President Trump’s speech provoked former President George W. Bush to remark: “That was some weird shit.” 

Weirdness, however, is in the eye of the beholder. Trump’s forthcoming speech will not ennoble. But neither will it sound that weird.

The world has got used to Trump. He is being taken seriously. Trump and his dogma have a legitimacy absent in 2017.

Trump’s authority is evident in the rush to Mar-a-Lago by American business leaders, the pliancy of most Republicans in Congress and the caution that American major media organisations display towards him. 

What should the rest of the world expect?

The runes suggest that this administration’s external policy will draw on three broad tendencies.

The first – let’s call it the Trump tendency – will be based on Trump’s own instincts. (Pity Panama, Greenland and the World Health Organisation).

His approach will be premised on visible, preferably immediate, wins. Arguments about American values or long-term American strategic interests will not have much currency.

Some proponents of the Trump tendency are described as “isolationist”.

In today’s parlance “isolationism” has come to mean a chariness about involvement in international conflict where the United States does not have a big dog in the fight. It involves suspicion about alliances, particularly with Europe. It is currently associated with those who are arguing for diminished American support for Ukraine

A second tendency draws on the views of Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, Trump’s picks respectively as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser.

Its advocates question the extent of American support for Ukraine. They believe that Europe should pay more for NATO. However, they are not about to throw in the towel on Ukraine or walk away from NATO. 

They are hardline on China and Iran and flatly pro-Israel. They think similarly to the neo-conservatives in the George W. Bush administration, without that group’s ideological fervour or proclivity to commit American troops abroad.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, former Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell, argued along lines that constitute a third tendency.

This is essentially an iteration of the traditional conservative Republican approach to international policy. It emphasises American global primacy based on hard power and support for alliances. 

Most of America’s allies under their current governments would be uncomfortable – some acutely so – with the Trump tendency.

Many would also find aspects of the Rubio tendency problematic, particularly if, as it promises, it is hawkish on Taiwan and goes substantially further than Biden in support of Israel’s actions in the Middle East.

The McConnell tendency is a familiar policy framework, which most allies could accept. 

But while this administration’s policy may be influenced by the McConnell tendency, the Trump and Rubio tendencies are likely to dominate.

The eccentricities of the Trump tendency were apparent in his first Administration.  However, they mattered less because, COVID apart, the world was more stable. 

When Trump’s first term ended the only area of major great power contention was US-China.

Self-evidently, the Ukraine war and Israel-Palestine add to the complexities Trump will now face. 

He will confront a quintessential issue for foreign policy practitioners: the importance of balance.

If an American push to end the war in Ukraine ends up favouring Russia, and/or if American negotiations with the Europeans on NATO go off the rails, the Chinese will perceive the West as entering fragile strategic territory, with implications for Asia. They will be right. We need a strong America.

But American resolve in Europe, the Middle East and Asia needs to be tempered by an understanding of thinking in the rest of the world. Those favouring the Trump and Rubio tendencies have not shown much interest in this.

The West, particularly the United States, has lost ground in the past decade by seeking support for its own objectives arising from Ukraine and Gaza, while being perceived as ignoring the concerns of the developing world on debt, climate, people movements, and so on.

Centrist members of the Global South such as Indonesia have joined the BRICS group (initially Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and others such as Thailand and Turkey (a NATO Member) are in line for membership, one indication that the pull of Western soft power has dissipated. 

These questions will not keep the lights on in Trump’s Washington. They should. Russia and China have increased their influence in the Global South not because their policies are that attractive, but because many of ours are not.

As former British Prime Minister, Harold McMillan observed, the greatest challenge to statesmen lies with events. These are hard to foresee. But their backdrop is visibly changing.

John McCarthy AO is Senior Adviser at Asialink and former Australian Ambassador to the US and several Asian countries.