China’s history lessons for the present

China recently celebrated the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, further cementing the Chinese Communist Party’s position as one of the most successful and long-lasting governing Communist regimes.

In his speech at the celebratory banquet, President Xi Jinping credited the CCP with creating the “twin miracles of rapid economic growth and long-term social stability.” It was a primarily forward-looking speech, arguing that the central task for the Party and the state was to achieve the goal of building China into a strong country and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernisation.

Yet underpinning the forward drive was the implicit reminder that only the CCP can help China achieve it’s “historical mission” to return China to a position of strength and international eminence. Indeed, throughout Xi’s time in power, the rejuvenation of the CCP and through it China has often been linked to the personal leadership of Xi Jinping.

When Xi came to power in 2012, he took over a rising economic power, but one in which many of the easy gains of economic growth had already been achieved, and which was now encountering structural issues. The perception was of a political system rife with corruption, a Party lax in discipline and ideological adherence, a society that had lost its moral compass.

The solution to the problem was moral, ideological and rooted in historical lessons, for Party members as well as society at large. Compared to previous leaders, Xi has put much greater emphasis on correctly remembering history, both through early statements such as the ‘two negations’ (liangge buneng fouding), which asserted the equal importance of the development of the Mao years and the Reform era, and through repeated warnings against “historical nihilism” (essentially any historical narrative other than the official one).

We saw the release of a new historical resolution in 2021, only the third in Party history after previous versions at pivotal moments in 1945 and 1981, and which cemented Xi’s status as equal to that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The importance of history has been reflected symbolically too, such as the sites of Xi’s visits after each confirmation by the Party Congress: in 2012, Xi and other leaders visited Beijing’s National Museum to view the exhibition on party history entitled “The Road to Rejuvenation”; in 2017, the visit was to the site of the First CCP Party Congress in Shanghai; while in 2022, they visited Yan’an, the much-idealised base area during the Sino-Japanese War.

The message has been reiterated rhetorically, with phrases like “remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind” (buwang chuxin, laoji shiming) blanketing the streets of China from 2017 onwards, as well as Xi’s exhortations from 2014 onwards to “make good use of red resources, carry forward red traditions and pass on red genes” (ba hongse ziyuan liyong hao, ba hongse chuangtong fayang hao, ba hongse jiyin chuancheng hao).  Overall, while multiple factors remain fundamental to Party legitimacy, a clear turn to history can be discerned.

Many commentators have suggested that this turn to history, this resurgence of the Party as a muscular moral authority, is primarily instrumental in intention: as China’s economic growth slows, the Party’s ability to guarantee ever improving livelihoods (particularly for the growing middle class) falters, and thus challenges one of the key pillars of Party legitimacy in the Reform era. With the economic downturn, the narrative goes, the Party needs to offer alternative pillars of support, in order to maintain regime stability at a time of domestic and international challenges.

There is no doubt that the turn to Party history has served this purpose. But it would be a mistake to interpret it in such narrow terms. When put in the broader context of Xi’s rule, it is clear that it is part of a deeper push to find a stronger moral and ideological base for both CCP rule and for Chinese society more broadly. We can see it in the context of the widespread anti-corruption campaign, on the push for Party discipline, but also in anti-poverty policies and the much-discussed concept of “common prosperity”.

Concerns about a moral crisis both within the Party and Chinese society precede Xi Jinping’s ascendence: former Premier Wen Jiabao warned of the decay of public morality and social trust in 2011, and it has long been discussed on social media. While the government has continued the promotion of China’s long civilizational history as a source of moral value, equally key has been the attention to the revolution that brought the CCP to power in 1949, with particular lessons to be learned from the close relationship between the Party and the people, unswerving faith in Party leadership, and a Party that sought to improve the lives of the people, rather than themselves.

It is often assumed that the young middle-class care little for politics, that despite their oft reported patriotism, they are largely numb to the moralising campaigns of the Party, and that their loyalty is derived only from their growing wealth. But again, it would be a mistake to understand loyalty is such pragmatic terms.

The Party’s success in making revolutionary history both significant and even enjoyable to the youth can be demonstrated through the rising numbers of “Red tourism” visits. Red tourism refers to visits related to Party history: key sites from the early years of the Party, to the War of Resistance Against the Japanese (World War Two), and the Civil War that brought the CCP to power. According to Chinese government numbers, annual visits continue to grow, and it is not just the older generation undertaking these visits. In 2022, the generation born in the 1980s constituted 41% of total visits, while those born in the 1990s represented 26%.

These Red Tourism sites build on the patriotic education that has been a crucial part of the education system since the 1990s, but aims to do so in ways that cultivate revolutionary spirit through immersive experiences. Former Communist base areas or important historical sites like Jinggangshan, Ruijin, Zunyi, and Yan’an, give tourists an opportunity to peek into the spartan caves where former leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others lived, to dress up in replica military uniforms, to watch cultural performances, even take part in daily life activities from the 1930s and 1940s. Rather than dull proselytisation, Red tourism, as part of China’s creative and cultural industry landscape, has reproduced revolutionary culture as a form of cultural capital for the patriotic urban middle class.

In a radically changed China, the Party is keen to keep notions of national struggle and identity alive and relevant. The turn to history draws on this in numerous ways. In harking back to the ideological purity of the revolutionary period, the government asserts the continued relevance of the political playbook of a different era.

For the populace, even while the youth cosplay as revolutionary soldiers, attention to the hardships of the revolutionary past serves to remind the country of the progress achieved under the CCP. The focus on history, therefore, always has one eye looking backwards while the other faces forward: the success of the revolution that brought the PRC into existence continues to be the anchor that legitimises the CCP as the only force capable of achieving national rejuvenation and transforming China into a modern socialist country.

Emily Williams is a cultural historian of modern China and Associate Professor at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University where she is head of the Department of China Studies.