Trump’s North Korea nuclear diplomacy: Between bad and worse

The first month of Donald Trump’s second term was marked by a whirlwind of activity. Among the numerous issues at hand, the "North Korean question," largely sidelined during the Biden administration, once again moved towards center stage. Amid the pursuit of territorial acquisitions, tariff negotiations, and efforts to mediate in the Ukraine conflict, Trump made several notable and, at times, controversial statements regarding North Korea. 

Despite their contentious nature, a discernible strategy appears to be taking shape. The White House seems to be steering toward what is commonly referred to as a "Small Deal" or "Hanoi 2.0."

Since his inauguration, Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to engage in talks with North Korean autocrat Kim Jong Un. Notably, the US President has begun referring to North Korea as a “nuclear state,” a term long considered taboo in US diplomatic discourse. While Trump is not known for his consistency, it is significant that similar statements about North Korea have been echoed by his officials, including the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth.

At the same time, some US officials have paid lip service to the long-standing goal of “complete denuclearisation” as the ultimate objective of US policy toward North Korea. However, it is hard to ignore the noticeable decline in the frequency of such statements compared to earlier periods.

What does all this mean? Most likely, the Trump administration plans to resume talks with North Korea, picking up where it left off in February 2019 when the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi failed to yield results. Trump’s goal seems to align with what North Korea experts commonly refer to as a “small deal.”  This means, among other things, accepting North Korea’s status as a defacto nuclear state – at least implicitly. 

Such an admission, long considered taboo by both the US and the broader international community, can be delayed for a few more years but likely not avoided indefinitely. The chances of compelling North Korea to denuclearise are virtually nonexistent, and further delays in reaching agreements will only exacerbate an already dire situation.

North Korea now possesses several dozen nuclear warheads and a wide array of delivery systems. It either already has, or will soon develop, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear warheads to any location within the continental United States. There is little doubt that all of Japan, along with parts of US territory – such as Alaska and Guam – are already within range of North Korea’s deployed weapons systems.

Experience has demonstrated that the US, indeed the entire world, has literally no way to push North Korea towards denuclearisation. Neither economic rewards nor sanctions are likely to work. 

North Korean leaders are not willing to trade their nuclear weapons for economic concessions. While they may desire economic growth, they believe survival comes first. They are convinced that if they give up their “precious sword” (a poetic term often used in North Korean media to describe their nuclear arsenal) they will eventually face an existential crisis and lose everything, including perhaps even their lives. Their fears are reinforced by the examples of Libya and Ukraine, two countries that abandoned their nuclear programs in exchange for promises of economic aid and security, only to face devastating consequences later. As a result, North Korean decision-makers view denuclearisation as a suicidal option and cannot be bribed into accepting it.

Pressure tactics are equally ineffective. The sanctions regime has proven largely inefficient, which is hardly surprising given that history repeatedly shows sanctions rarely achieve their intended goals. Now, with Russia and China unlikely to adhere to the sanctions framework, the notion of using economic pressure to coerce North Korea can be considered a dead-end strategy.

Neither promising North Korea economic benefits nor attempting to starve it into submission is likely to work. North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons, and what’s particularly concerning is that, in recent years, the country seems to have surpassed the defensive threshold. North Korean efforts are now focused on developing ICBMs and low-yield (or "tactical") nuclear weapons.

The most likely motivation behind this shift is North Korea’s intention to acquire the military means for a potential invasion of South Korea. Their newly developed ICBM capabilities may be intended to deter the United States by creating the possibility of nuclear retaliation, effectively blackmailing Washington into staying neutral and abandoning its treaty obligations to defend South Korea in the event of an attack. Meanwhile, the development of tactical nuclear weapons is intended to provide North Korean forces with a decisive advantage on the battlefield, potentially enabling them to win what they see as the "Second Korean War."

In short, North Korea’s nuclear program is evolving, becoming more dangerous, and shifting from a primarily defensive posture to a more offensive one. The only realistic way to halt this progression is through a negotiated deal—one that, whether liked or not, will not include North Korean denuclearisation but could still meaningfully reduce the threat level.

The only deal that still seems possible is a revival of the Hanoi compromise, or a "small deal." This would involve North Korea dismantling or disabling its known nuclear facilities. In return, the U.S. would offer concessions, likely in the form of lifting certain sanctions. While sanctions do not pose an existential threat to North Korea, they are a significant inconvenience.

This compromise would be far from perfect. North Korea would retain its existing stockpile of warheads and any fissile material it had produced prior to the agreement. There’s also a high likelihood that North Korea would cheat by attempting to continue its nuclear weapons research and production. However, with its uranium enrichment sites and nuclear reactors demolished, its capacity for clandestine operations would be significantly diminished.

That said, it’s unclear whether North Korea would be interested in such a deal today. Unlike in 2019, Pyongyang can now depend on Chinese support and profits from selling weapons and a “fighting force” to Russia, making sanctions less of a burden.

Nevertheless, Donald Trump appears eager to give it another try. He will likely face criticism for pursuing this path, but, as with most policy decisions, it’s often a choice not between good and bad but between bad and worse. In this case, a "small deal" that implicitly or explicitly acknowledges North Korea as a nuclear power is a flawed solution. The problem is that all the other available alternatives are even worse.

Andrei Lankov is a historian and professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University, Seoul, South Korea.

Image: Shutterstock. Shee Heng Chong. North Korean soldiers stand guard at the northern buffer zone of the JSA at the DMZ in Panmunjom Sept 10, 2010.